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This paper examines Sherman's growth as a strategic thinker and successful strategist. It explores how his life shaped him to fill the role that he did in the Civil War and what things contributed to his development into the soldier who could plan and execute the Northstrategy in the last year of the war.
It also focuses on specific instances of success and failure that led him to the position from which he could influence, if not actually author, the strategy followed by the Union in the last year of the war.
It also examines what Sherman brought to his relationship with Ulysses S. Grant and how that relationship affecte the evolving strategy that guided the Union Army after Grant ascended to the leadership of all Union Armies. This paper examines Sherman's growth as a strategic thinker and successful strategist.
It explores how his life shaped him to fill the role that he did in the Civil War and what things contributed to his development into the soldier who couLa plan and execute the North's strategy in the last year of the war.
It also examines what Sherman brought to his relationship with Ulysses S. Grant and how that relationship affected the evolving strategy that guided the Union Army after Grant ascended to the leadership of all Union Armies. Sherman's successful collaboration with his contemporary and commander, U. S. Grant, brought the Union victories in the field and eventually victory in the war. Sherman's contributions to their efforts took many forms. He was a superb subordinate to Grant, aggressive in the field, quick in carrying out his orders and in accomplishing his missions.
He was also able, perhaps to a greater degree than Grant, to see and understand things about this war that often escaped others.
Despite his ultimate success Sherman did not appear on the field with all of the answers and all of the authority he needed to defeat the South. Indeed, he spent the first two years of the war growing, sometimes through very painful lessons, to reach his potential as a commander and strategist. But these first two years of the war were only a continuation of a lifetime of trials, growth, observation, study, and occasional failure that finally produced the Army
Commander who would contribute so much to the Union victory in the Civil War.
Sherman's growth from the "tall, slim, loose jointed lad, with red hair, fair burned skin, and piercing black eyes"I who left his home in Lancaster, Ohio to report to West Point in 1836 to the "master grand strategist of uur Civil
War" 2 had many roots. These were divergent, wide ranging, and eclectic, but they all found a common home in the far reaching, ever hungry intellect, and exceptional energy of Indians who were being forcibly transplanted from Florida.
The service was not as active as he would have liked, but it did offer him the opportunity to serve far away from what he described as the problems of living in "civilization."
Sherman always enjoyed duty in the more remote districts of the land. Being away from the trials of the civilized world enabled him to be outdoors, to challenge himself physically, and to expand his never satisfied hunger for knowledge, especially for geography and topography.
In a letter to a friend he wrote:
Every day I feel more and more in need of an atlas, such as your father has at home; and as the knowledge of geography, in its minutest detail, is essential to a true military education, the idle time necessarily spent here might be properly devoted to it. I wish therefore, you would procure for me the best geography and atlas (not school) It also provided Sherman a steady income and relieved him of the day to day concerns of providing for his family of Ellen, who was at the time pregnant, and their five children.
He looked forward to the tangible rewards as well as the intangible benefits of his new position.
In a letter to
Ellen he wrote about the place that might be their first real permanent home:
Since I left New Orleans I have felt myself oppressed by circumstances I could not control, but I begin to feel footing and will get saucy ...
Therefore if Louisiana will endow this college properly, and is fool enough to give me $5,000 a year, we will drive our tent pins and pick out a magnolia under which to sleep the long sleep. 15
Despite his enthusiasm for his new position, he struggled through two more tempting offers for civilian You are bound to fail. Only in your spirit and determination are you prepared for war.
In all else you are totally unprepared, with a bad cause to start with. At first you will make headway, but as your limited resources begin to fail, and shut out from the markets of Europe by blockade as you will be, your cause will begin to wane ... if your people would but stop and think, they must see that in the end you will surely fail.:
While Sherman could see the problem and that the South's solution to it would end in failure, he was still convinced that it would come to war. He believed strongly in the rule of law and in the Constitution of the United States. He explained in a letter to his wife why obedience to the law was critical and why he saw the actions of the South leading to civil war:
Our country has become so democratic that the mere popular opinion of any town or village rises above the law.
Men have ceased to look to the constitutions and law books for their guides, but have studied popular opinions in bar rooms and village newspapers, and that was and is the law. The old women and grannies of New England, reasoning from abstract principles, must defy the constitution of the country.
The people of the South, not relying on the Federal Government, must allow people to favor filibustering expeditions against the solemn treaties of the land, and everywhere from California to Maine any man could do murder, robbery, or arson if the people's prejudices lay in that direction. 19 Although Sherman recognized the questions plaguing the nation at the close of the 1850s were serious, he also believed that they would settle themselves if given sufficient time.
His correspondence in the late 1850s and early 1860 with his brother John, then a Representative from Ohio in the U. S. Congress, show how strongly Sherman wished that the nation would allow itself the time for its problems to resolve themselves.
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But the nation would not. I have seen enough of war not to be caught by its first glittering bait, and when I engage in this it must be with a full consciousness of its real character. I did approve of the President's call and only said that it should have been 300,000 instead of 75,000 .. 22 Sherman also wrote to his brother John, who had urged him to take an active role early, about how he saw the war.
"The time will come" he wrote, "when professional knowledge will be appreciated, when men that can be trusted will be wanted, and I will bide my time." 2 3 Despite Sherman's reluctance to take an active part in the war, he already knew how the war would have to be fought.
Even from the beginning he was able to view the war strategically.
He saw with a clarity that would not arrive ... for I have no political ambition, and have naturally more confidence in Regulars than Militia. Not that they are better, braver, or more patriotic, but because I know the people will submit with better grace to them than to Militia of any particular locality. out a big map of the United States, spread it on the floor, and on their hands and knees discussed the probable salient strategic places of the war. They singled out Richmond, Vicksburg, Nashville, Knoxville, and Chattanooga.
To me it had always appeared strange that they were able confidently and correctly to designate the lines of operations and strategic points of a war not yet commenced. I will not volunteer as a soldier, because rightly or wrongly, I feel unwilling to take a mere private's place, and having for many years lived in California and Louisiana, the men are not well enough acquainted with me to elect me to my appropriate place.
Should my services be needed, the records of the War Department will enable you to designate the station in which I can render most ... that the North and South would be reunited only after the South had laid down its arms. And the only way to achieve that end was to carry the war to the homeland --to the lives and property of Mississippi, Georgia, South Carolina, and North Carolina. Before the battle of Shiloh, I had been cast down by a mere newspaper assertion of 'crazy'; but that single battle had given me new life, and now I was in high feather; and I argued with him that, if he went away, events would go right along, and he would be left out; whereas, if he remained, some happy accident might restore him to favor and his true place.19
Fortunately for the Union, and for Sherman, Grant took his friend's advice and remained.
The relationship that would be so propitious for the fortunes of the North was 22 forged and would not be shaken. I knew that wherever I was that you thought of me, and that if I got in a tight place you would come --if alive. He also announced that for every attack on river traffic he would expel ten families, chosen at random, from the city.
After only four months in Memphis he wrote to Grant:
We cannot change the hearts of these people of the South, but we can make war so terrible that they will realize the fact that, however brave and gallant and devoted to their country, they are still mortal and should exhaust all peaceful remedies before they fly to war. 46 How he would make the people of the South realize that fact was becoming ever more clear to him.
Sherman's time at Memphis came to an end in December, 1862 when he departed to begin the campaign against Vicksburg.
Although his stay in Memphis was relatively short, the things he learned there and the successes he enjoyed continued his evolution as a strategist. On the day he departed Memphis for the operation against Vicksburg he wrote to his brother "We must fight it out if it devastates the land and costs every cent in the North." 47 Sherman drew heavily upon Grant's "simple faith in success" even though he did not always agree with his plans. Vicksburg was so important that its history has been well studied and well described in all the books treating of the civil war .. "., 48 Sherman himself was one of the first, if not the first, to study the campaign well.
From his study of the various attempts to capture Vicksburg came some of the last pieces that would form his strategy for the remainder of the war.
Among the lessons that Sherman took from the six month long effort to capture Vicksburg were those dealing with logistics, and the ability of an army to move without being tied to fixed lines of communications. This insight came from two incidents, one at the beginning of the campaign and one closer to the successful conclusion of it. I have the Nashville railroad guarded by three regiments, yet it is far from safe; as soon as actual hostilities commence, these roads will be interrupted, and we will be in a dilemma ... all these detachments weaken the main force and endanger the whole. 4 9
In July 1862, upon being recalled from Holly Springs to protect the railroad through Corinth, Mississippi, he despaired "of ever protecting a railroad presenting a broad front of 100 miles from their (rebel cavalry) dashes." I do not calculate upon the possibility of supplying the Army with full rations from Grand Gulf.
I know it will be impossible with out constructing additional roads.
What I do expect, however, is to get up what rations of hard bread, coffee, and salt we can, and make the country furnish the balance. West is with me there. I think I see one or two quick blows that will astonish the natives of the South and will convince them that, though to stand behind a big cottonwood and shoot at a passing boat is good sport and safe, it may still reach and kill their friends and families hundreds of miles off.
For every bullet shot at a steamboat, I would shoot a thousand 30-pounder Parrotts into even helpless towns on Red, Ouachita, Yazoo or wherever a boat can float or soldier march.
Well, I think that in all January and part of February I can do something in this line. This expedition is one of celerity, and all things must tend to that ... not a tent, from the commander-inchief down, will be carried. The sick will be left behind, and the surgeons can find houses and sheds for all hospital purposes. In a paper to be read to civilians he wrote:
If they want eternal war, well and good, we accept the issue ... A people who will persevere in war beyond a certain limit ought to know the consequence. Many, many people with less pertinacity have been wiped out of national existence."
He finished his message by telling the people "to those who submit to rightful law and authority, all gentleness and forbearance; but to the petulant and persistent secessionists, why, death is mercy and the quicker he or she is disposed of the better. 65 Sherman's evolution from the lad who entered West Point to the grand strategist who would devastate the South was 33 almost complete. Although no notes or records exist of the time at Burnet House, we know that when it was over Sherman told his wife "with the spring campaign the real war would begin. All that had gone before had been mere skirmishing."6 9 Other than that we must rely on Sherman's recollections many years after the war had ended:
Yonder began the campaign ... we finally settled on a pl-an. He was to go for Lee and I was to go for Joe It was that god of efficiency that enabled Sherman to see the hard road that would lead to peace. It was his personality, his experience, and his willingness to abandon the orthodox in order to gain success that gave him the vision to see that the "legitimate object of war (is) a more perfect peace." 72 Finally, it wdb his firm belief that the best way to achieve that object was to wage war so harshly, so efficiently, that the entire enemy population--its army, its 
